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This article was submitted initially as a research 
paper for my course, Canadian Government and 
Politics. I recommended its publication both because 
of its intrinsic merit and because it addresses matters of 
vital concern to Montanans. To conserve space, the 
footnotes and bibliography have been omitted. 
Mr. Hoklin served as Legislative Assistant to 
Congressman Max Baucus prior to the time when this 
paper was drafted. His duties on the staff of the 
Congressman brought him into contact with the Cabin 
Creek controversy. Thus, he was able to bring to the 
preparation of this paper a perspective not normally 
possible in student research. The opinions expressed in 
the article are those of Mr. Hoklin. The Bureau takes 
no position other than to encourage the expression and 
dissemination of informed opinion on issues of public 
consequence. 
A lifelong resident of Montana, Lonn Hoklin served 
as a combat soldier in Viet Nam with the U.S. Army, 
1969-1971. He is currently completing requirements 
for a B.A. Degree in History from the University of 
Montana. He has recently accepted the position of 
Executive Assistant to the Attorney General of 
Montana. 
Thomas Payne 
Professor of 
Political Science 
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The North Fork of the Flathead River begins in the high 
country just south of the village of Fernie, British Columbia, 
and winds toward the U.S.-Canada boundary through an 
undeveloped valley walled on the American side by the 
majestic, heavily forested mountains of Glacier National 
Park. Five miles northeast of Columbia Falls, Montana, the 
North Fork joins the Middle Fork which rushes out of 
Montana's fabled Bob Marshall Wilderness, to flow 
thereafter 'into Flathead Lake, America's largest natural 
body of fresh water west of the Mississippi. 
The entire Flathead River drainage is rich in wildlife and 
fish that depend on a delicate balance in the mountain 
ecosystem. A well developed recreation and tourism 
industry thrives on the Montana side. In recognition of the 
unique natural and economic values of the area, the 94th 
Congress enacted the Flathead Wild and Scenic Rivers Act 
which established a federal policy of maintaining the river in 
its natural, free-flowing state. · 
In 1968, Rio Algom Limited, a division of Britain's giant 
Rio Tinto Zinc, embarked on a joint venture with Pan Ocean 
Oil Limited of Calgary to conduct economic and engineering 
studies for coal development in southeast British Columba. 
Known as Sage Creek Coal Limited, the combine initiated 
exploration on 24,652 acres of Crown Land (publicly 
owned) as authorized by fifty-one separate licenses issued by 
the government of British Columbia. Seven years of 
mapping, trenching, drilling and underground sampling at a 
cost of three million dollars resulted in Sage Creek's decision 
to begin a final feasibility assessment of a particularly rich 
site on two hills astride Cabin Creek, a tributary to 
Montana's scenic Flathead River. 
The hills contain an estimated 60 million tons of high-
quality metallurgical coal, worth approximately thirty 
dollars per ton, about seven times as valuable as coal 
produced in America's Northern Great Plains (due to higher 
BTU content). Removing the coal, reported Bill Schneider, 
editor of Montana Outdoors, requires virtual annihilation of 
the two hills since the seams lie on an angle well beneath the 
crests. 
The initial flurry of American concern over the effects of 
proposed Cabin Creek mining followed Schneider's 
September, 1974, report in Montana Outdoors; central to 
the public's misgivings was the question of whether 
Montana's much loved Flathead Valley could be spared the 
disasters of down-stream pollution from chemical leaching 
and siltation - effects well known through past American 
experience in the coal fields of Kentucky and Appalachia. 
The crescendo of public outcries and the urgings of 
Montana's congressional delegation compelled the U.S. 
State Department to notify the Canadian government of 
possible trans boundary difficulties relating to proposed coal 
development at Cabin Creek. The federal governments 
traded diplomatic notes, and various Montana political 
leaders made exofficio contacts with Canadians at both the 
national and provincial levels. Montana's U.S. 
Representative Max Baucus flew to Toronto in April, 1975, 
to confer directly with Rio Algom officials over the exact 
nature of the compifoy's intentions at Cabin Creek and to 
determine what steps might be taken to protect the Flathead 
drainage. Upon his return to Washing-ton, Baucus issued a 
detailed report on the meeting and called upon the State 
Department to seek Canada's cooperation in referring the 
Cabin Creek matter to the International Joint Commission 
(IJC). 
"While I was encouraged by the prospect of an 
environmental study and the willingness of the officials to 
answer my questions," Baucus stated in the report, "as many 
questions emerged as were answered." 
Baucus and officials representing Montana's governor, 
the U.S. State Department, the national Canadian 
government and the province of British Columbia 
subsequently toured the Cabin Creek site and received 
briefings by Rio Algom officials. In October, 1975, however, 
the vexing questions underscored by the Baucus Report of 
six months earlier remained unanswered. 
"Rio Algom Mines Limited has yet to guarantee with 
satisfactory specificity that chemical leaching from the 
excavations will not damage the transboundary flow to the 
detriment of health and property," Baucus wrote to 
Assistant Secretary of State Robert McCloskey on October 
2, 1975. "Serious questions remain as to whether siltation 
can be prevented to a degree sufficient for adherence to the 
Boundary Waters Treaty, and whether Rio Algom and 
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British Columbia are fully cognizant of the specific 
constraints governing such adherence." 
His inspection of the Cabin Creek site and conversations 
with company officials, the congressman declared, indicated 
that Rio Algom had ignored certain environmental 
considerations, and gave reason to doubt that the company 
would voluntarily suspend its development plans in the face 
of evidence "demonstrating the imminence of serious 
damage to the Flathead's sensitive aquatic species." 
Moreover, Baucus charged, the government of British 
Columbia had not indicated "beyond rather vague 
assurances that such important factors as aquatic life are of 
significant concern in setting criteria for the disposition of 
mining lease applications." 
The assurances sought by Baucus and others related to 
coal production licensing, a matter in which the province of 
British Columbia - not the Dominion - holds jurisdiction. 
Canadian responses to American questions on all fronts had 
consisted of general assurances that existing agreements 
would be honored, i.e., those prohibiting transboundary 
water pollution to the detriment of health or property on the 
other side of the boundary; virtually every communication 
from Canada emphasized that Rio Algom's activities to date 
had been entirely preliminary in nature, and that the 
company had yet to apply for coal production licensing. 
These facts prompted the State Department to resist 
recommendations for submitting the issue to the Inter-
national Joint Commission, and to parry suggestions for 
immediated consultations with the Canadians. 
Baucus' October 2 letter to McCloskey recommended 
immediate consultations between the Dominion, the 
province, the State Department and Montana, a matter 
Baucus continued to press through his staff and through 
personal contact with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
and other officials. On October 16, 1975, due primarily to 
Baucus' efforts, the State Department changed its mind and 
drafted a diplomatic note to the Canadian Embassy which it 
forwarded on October 20: 
The United States Government is of the view that the Rio Algom Mines 
project could seriously damage efforts to preserve the unique environmental 
value of Glacier National Park, the Flathead National Forest, and the 
Flathead River Basin and could cause injury to both public and private 
property in these areas . . . 
The Department of State therefore suggests that consultations be held 
with respect to this matter at the earliest possible date. 
II 
On January 11, 1909, American and British officials met 
in Washington, D.C., to sign the Boundary Waters Treaty, a 
list of formal provisions governing management of water 
issues along the 5,500-mile U.S.-Canada boundary 
(including the Alaska-Canada border). Article IV of the 
treaty provides that "waters flowing across the boundary 
shall not be polluted on either side to the injury of health or 
property on the other." Article VII established an 
International Joint Commission (IJC) to assist the 
signatories in enforcement of the treaty. At this point, som~ 
examination of these two features is in order. 
Article IV appears to many Americans to be a substantive 
agreement which advances a prima facie guaranty that all 
steps will be taken by both governments to prevent harmful 
transboundary pollution - at least that's how Americans 
are temped to read it, succumbing as they to do a passion for 
explicitly written laws and regulations. In the United States a 
treaty delivers the force and effect of law, and is thus readily 
enforceable, but this is not necessarily the case in Canada. 
While attending the 1976 session of the Canada-United 
States Interparliamentary Group (Jan. 29-Feb. 2, Key 
Biscayne, Fla.), a prominent Canadian Member of 
Parliament (MP), Senator George Clifford Van Roggen of 
British Columbia, remarked to an American delegate on the 
legal status of international treaties in Canada. Treaties, Van 
Roggen said, cannot be introduced or pleaded in Canadian 
courts; in some matters, he added, the Dominion can 
overrule provincial actions and policies, a statement that 
Americans who fear for the Flathead might find 
encouraging, particularly if they count on the Boundary 
Waters Treaty for the Flathead's salvation. Such 
"disallowances" by the Dominion, Van Roggen stressed on 
the other hand, rarely occur. Since an examination of this 
important side issue appears later, the immediate focus will 
continue to be on the standing of treaties in Canada: based 
on the inadmissability of treaties in Canadian courts, one 
could state that treaties have standing only as administrative 
instruments, and then only as they relate to federal actions 
and policies because of the rarity of disallowances. 
Since Canadian courts intervene into governmental 
affairs only on the basis of administrative decisions - not on 
matters of policy - a near total lack of legal standing for 
treaties is implied. The Canadian system disallows judicial 
review even of policies relating to treaty enforcement, so the 
U.S. must rely on the good will of Canadian officials in 
matters of enforcement, not on Canadian courts or on legal 
standing. Fortunately for the U.S., Canadian good will has 
remained steadfast since the inception of the Boundary 
Waters Treaty. 
The second feature of the treaty in need of some analysis is 
the International Joint Commission, a creation of Article 
VII. A quasi-judicial tribunal consisting of six 
commissioners (three Canadian and three American), the 
IJC carries out four distinct responsibilities - not as two 
delegations under instructions from their respective 
governments, but as a "single body." 
One responsibility is to approve or deny "applications" for 
the use, obstruction or diversion of transboundary waters in 
order to ensure that all interests on both sides of the 
boundary are duly protected or indemnified. Another 
responsibility, perhaps the most critical to this study, is 
investigation of specific boundary water problems after 
receiving a "reference" from one or both governments. 
Article IX of the treaty enables either government to refer an 
issue to the IJC, but the traditional method has been 
bilateral with both governments consulting in advance on 
the "terms of reference," that is, the specific points and issues 
with which the Commission should concern itself. Following 
its investigation of the case within the parameters of the 
reference, the IJC reports the ''facts and circumstances" to 
the two governments along with its recommendations. Thus 
prepared, the governments hold further consultations in 
order to forge a workable solution to the problem. 
A third responsibility hinges to some extent on the second. 
After the governments have agreed to implement a solution 
to a specific boundary waters problem, the IJC - when 
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requested by the two governments - assumes responsibility 
for monitoring, surveillance and coordination of the 
implementation. The object is to ensure compliance with the 
agreement by all parties associated with the issue, be they 
individuals, firms, or state, local or provincial governemnts; 
evidence of noncompliance is reported to both national 
governments. 
The IJC has yet to exercise its fourth responsibility 
because the two governments have yet to authorize it as 
provided by Article X of the treaty. Were Canada and the 
U.S. ever unable to come to terms on a given boundary 
waters issue, an appropriate bilateral reference would 
empower the IJC to adjudicate the matter after prior advice 
and consent from the U.S. Senate and the Canadian 
Governor General in Council. 
It was noted earlier that Representative Max Baucus, after 
his return from discussions with Rio Algom in Toronto, 
urged the State Department to refer the Cabin Creek issue to 
the IJC. A number of Western Montana citizens' groups 
echoed Baucus' call throughout the following year, perhaps 
with the uninformed judgment that the IJC had power to 
"solve" the Cabin Creek problem authoritatively and 
without delay. The State Department's public image 
suffered somewhat for its resisting pleas for an IJC reference, 
but subsequent conversation between State's Canadian desk 
and Baucus' staff revealed the reasons for the resistance. 
First, the State Department believed (right or wrong) that 
the Cabin Creek issue had not yet developed sufficiently to 
provide U.S. and Canadian negotiators the kind of specific 
questions required for an IJC reference; Rio Algom, after 
all, had not even applied for production licensing; 
preliminary mining and marketing studies had not yet been 
completed; no one had yet conducted an environmental 
impact assessment. Moreover, the State Department had 
only recently experienced a disastrous deadlock with the 
Canadians over North Dakota's Garrison Diversion Project, 
a matter referred to the IJC in desperation. Several 
American observers believe that the State Department's 
reluctance to seek another reference stemmed from a wish to 
prove that diplomatic consultations outside the IJC can still 
solve transboundary controversies, and that the IJC should 
not become a "dumping ground" for hot issues. 
Secondly, there was no guaranty that the IJC could 
accomplish more than the current efforts. The professionals 
at the State Department were aware of the issues under 
discussion in diplomatic circles concerning the shortcomings 
and limited capabilities of the IJC, especially with respect to 
the rather lean financial resources afforded the Commission 
by the two governments. Recent history has demonstrated 
that the IJC is only as good as the political good will of the 
current Canadian and American policy makers. No example 
illustrates this more clearly than the performance of the 
Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement signed by President 
Nixon and Prime Minister Trudeau in 1972. 
The agreement resulted from an intensive IJC study of 
Great Lakes pollution initiated by a reference from both 
governments in 1964. In order to meet the objectives of the 
agreement by the December 31, 1975, deadline Congress 
amended the Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1965, 
which contained a general program of grants to the states for 
construction of sewage and water treatment facilities. 
Through amendments to the Act (in 1970 and 1972), 
Congress increased the federal share of funding to as much 
as seventy-five percent for priority projects; for the three-
year period including 1975, Congress appropriated $18 
billion to implement the Act. 
Though he had co-signed the Great Lakes Water Quality 
Agreement with Prime Minister Trudeau, President Nixon 
vetoed the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
Amendments of 1972, which Congress enacted to implement 
the agreement (in addition to meeting other objectives). 
Congress, in turn, overrode Nixon's veto, but the President 
then proceeded to impound $9 billion, half the appropriated 
amount earmarked for grants to the states under the Act. 
This lack of political "good will" delayed efforts to meet the 
deadline set forth in the agreement. Despite numerous 
examples of the IJC's successes, the record of the Great 
Lakes Water Quality Agreement is evidence of an inherent 
vulnerability within the system to lack of political good will 
on the part of one or both governments. 
III 
The importance of provincial good will to transboundary 
water issues becomes more clear in light of the overall 
provincial prerogatives in Canadian foreign policy. 
Uninitiated American observers might recoil against the 
reality that provinces do in fact conduct international 
affairs, often separate and apart from any Dominion 
guidance or control. Although American states exercise 
various prerogatives in foreign issues, primarily in matters 
involving international trade agreements, such transactions 
occur within a well defined framework of federal authority. 
No state legislature or governor presumes authority beyond 
that of the president in setting foreign policy. Legislatures 
and governors do issue symbolic policy statements in the 
form of resolutions and decrees, often on such subjects as 
United Nations membership and human rights, but 
American federalism assigns no legal force and effect to such 
actions. The Constitution stipulates that foreign policy will 
be solely a function of the presidency with advice and 
consent of the Senate. 
This is not to say that Canadian federalism disallows a 
unified national foreign policy. It does not. The following 
examples, however, illustrate a degree of provincial 
autonemy in foreign affairs not duplicated in the American 
experience, and hopefully serve to place in perspective the 
provincial role with respect to transboundary water issues. 
In the winter of 1976, the world community experienced 
tremors of apprehension over events in southern Africa. The 
issue of black majority rule in white-ruled African states 
exploded with a fury that not even the most well informed. 
observers had foretold. Extensive news coverage, replete 
with photographic footage of atrocities, assailed liberal 
democratic sensibilities throughout the Western world. So 
incensed was the government of Saskatchewan over the 
adamancy of South Africa's white regime against granting 
full political and civil rights to the black majority, that it 
enacted a boycott of South African Wines, a substantial 
import commodity. Such a boycott is unquestionably an act 
of foreign policy. 
A more dramatic act of provincial foreign policy occurred 
on January 28, 1976, when Saskatehewan enacted a bill to 
"nationalize" its resident potash industry. Since the mid-
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1960s, the American companies which control the industry 
have endured progressively heavier taxation by the province, 
and have resisted provincial pressures to increase potash 
production in the face of accelerating demand in the U.S. 
agricultural market. The provincial government naturally 
desires higher production in order to increase its share of 
revenues and economic stimulus from potash sales, but the 
companies fear depressed prices and lower profits resulting 
from increased supply. Having periodically threatened 
nationalization, the provincial government finally offered 
legislation to do just that, a development that American 
investors fear may irreparably damage U.S.-Canadian 
commercial relations. Delegates to the 1976 meeting of the 
Canada-U .S. Interparliamentary Group debated the issue at 
length and focussed much attention on the question of 
whether Canada's federal government should "disallow" the 
provincial government's action in the interest of preserving a 
critical feature of mutual relations. At length the Group 
reached the conclusion that a Dominion veto of provincial 
action is "more theoretical then fact," and that 
nationalization of the potash industry is "clearly a matter 
within the Provincial jurisdiction - which is closely guarded 
" 
The foregoing examples render a general perception of 
provincial prerogatives in U.S.-Canadian relations and 
illustrate the "confederal" relationship between the 
provinces and the Dominion. More akin to the Cabin Creek 
issue is the controversy surrounding the planned 
construction of a 1,200-million watt coal-fired electric power 
complex in southern Saskatchewan. The provincially owned 
Saskatchewan Power Corporation (SPC) has laid plans to 
dam the East Fork of the Poplar River in order to provide 
cooling water for the complex. The river, unfortunately, 
flows across the international boundary into Montana. 
Following the announcement of SPC's plans on 
September 11, 1974, the U.S. State Department received 
protests from Montanans who feared damage not only from 
SPC's appropriation of water, but also from imminent 
pollution. Subsequent consultations between the federal 
governments, Montana and Saskatchewan resulted in 
formation of a joint U. S.-Canadian task force charged with 
the responsibility of apportioning the Poplar's waters 
equitably. Attendant issues relating to potential pollution 
fell to the IJC in the course of its final evaluation of the task 
force's apportionment. Though Saskatchewan had endorsed 
formation of the task force, had agreed to participate in its 
operation, and had expressed a willingness to pursue a 
resolution of the conflict through traditional mechanisms, 
the provincial government authorized SPC in the spring of 
1976 to appropriate a considerable volume of the spring 
runoff to fill a power plant reservoir situated two miles north 
of th~ border. The action came after the task force's 
announced intention to recommend to the IJC a 50-50 
apportionment of the Poplar's waters, and before a public 
hearing could be held in accordance with customary 
procedure. 
The result of Saskatchewan's apparently cavalier 
treatment of the affair has been suspicion and uncertainty, 
particularly on the part of Montanans, over the efficacy of 
existing arrangements for dealing with transboundary water 
issues. Ensuing negotiations concerning a formal bilateral 
reference to the IJC have deadlocked over wording and 
content. Whispered allegations of "deals" between the State 
Department and Canada abound. The following excerpt 
from an Environmental Quality Council staff report bears 
witness to the public's misgivings as a result of 
Saskatchewan's response to the Poplar River contrversy: 
The treaty mechanism's emphasis on secrecy, its distance from the 
problems and people affected, and its inherent limitation of considering 
problems piecemeal and in isolation from the desires of affected citizens 
may mean the 1909 treaty is in need of overhaul, replacement or revision. 
Subjective judgments as to who is at fault in the Poplar 
River controversy must be withheld until the facts are in, and 
should not venture beyond statements of what has been 
perceived by one side or the other. Unfortunately, 
perceptions-not necessarily factual knowledge-often bear 
heavily on the success or failure of international 
consultations. Though Montanans now perceive 
Saskatchewan negatively because of the Poplar River 
developments, one should not assume that Saskatchewan is 
a maverick that rides roughshod over international 
agreements. The province has, in fact, a highly developed 
political system and is considerably mor~ experienced in 
international affairs than the state of Montana. 
The lessons of the preceding examples are nonetheless 
clear: provinces conduct foreign affairs, often independent 
of the Dominion; provinces, even when entering into 
international consultations to which the Dominion is a 
party, exercise remarkable autonomy (witness 
Saskatchewan's decision to apportion Poplar River water 
contrary to previous agreements with Montana, the State 
Department and the Dominion); successful operation of 
existing institutions for dealing with transboundary water 
problems requires provincial good will on he parts of the 
respective federal governments. 
IV 
The staggeringly vast expanses of Canada's "prairie 
provinces" roll steadily westward toward the majestic 
Canadian Rockies, away from the more densely populated 
"main stream" of Ontario and Quebec, the heartland of 
Canada. Even further west, beyond the prairies and the 
physical barrier of mountains, lies British Columbia, 
forested, rich in minerals, and apart. 
Insulated as it has been from the rest of Canada, British 
Columbia has reached outward from its Pacific shores to 
establish close and profitable relationships with merchants 
and markets throughout the world, and has built cities that 
are as beautiful as any on earth. That British Columbia 
looked first to the Pacific and not to its sister provinces for 
access to the outer world is understandable in more than 
geographical terms: the vast majority of its settlers came on 
ships and not on wagons or railroads. Many hailed from 
non-Canadian lands in the British Commonwealth. Many 
others were former Americans, fortune-seekers who found 
no gold in California's Gold Rush of 1849 but who were 
hearty enough to try it again in British Columbia's Rush of 
1859. This, perhaps more than anything else, explains the 
traditionally close associations between British Columbia 
and the American Pacific states, particularly California. 
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Since relatively few of the British stock pioneers came 
from other Canadian provinces, British Columbians have 
virtually no tradition of bitterness against the United States 
engendered by the American War for Independence. So 
strong, in fact, have been American-British Columbian ties, 
that a serious popular movement for American annexation 
emerged periodically in the latter 1800s. This distinctly un-
Canadian experience has, however, completely run its 
course and bears not at all on modern provincial politics and 
attitudes. 
British Columbia is no stranger to the arena of 
transboundary water affairs, a fact dramatically illustrated 
by its role in the implementation of the Columbia River 
Treaty. The province also participated actively in the lengthy 
discussions which led to the treaty's provisions, i.e., a plan 
for "cooperative development of the water resources of the 
Columbia River basin." Following trilateral proclamation 
of the treaty by President Lyndon Johnson, Prime Minister 
Lester Pearson and Premier William Bennett of British 
Columbia on September 16, 1964, the provincially owned 
British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority became the 
prime Canadian entity for the implementation of a massive 
project involving construction of hydroelectric generating 
facilities, transboundary flood control, and apportionment 
of waters. The Permanent Engineering Board of the 
Columbia River Treaty concluded in its Annual Report to 
the governments of the United States and Canada for 1976 
that the work prescribed by the sixty-year agreement is on 
schedule. 
While the success of the Columbia River Treaty thus far 
suggests that British Columbia is capable of masterful 
negotiation and steady good will, a more recent affair 
testifies to the institutional weaknesses examined earlier. In 
1942, the International Joint Commission granted 
perm_ission under Article IV of the Boundary Waters Treaty 
to the Seattle City Light Company to raise the height of Ross 
Dam, a hydro-electric generating facility on the Skagit 
River, thirty miles south of the British Columbia boundary. 
The additional height is needed, says the company, to raise 
the level of the reservoir and thus increase generating 
capacity for electricity-hungry Seattle. Because the plan 
would inundate 5, 180 acres stretching eight miles into British 
Columbia, the IJC's approval was contingent upon an 
agreement between the province and the city of Seattle as to 
appropriate compensation for the lost acreage. After twenty-
five years of sporadic negotiation, Seattle and British 
Columbia came to terms-Seattle would "rent" the 
inundated land for ninety-nine years at an annual charge of 
$34,566.21. 
The story, unfortunately, does not end there. Shortly after 
Seattle forwarded its first payment to Victoria, the 
provincial government responded to growing public 
indignation over the loss of land which is clearly a "unique 
and irreplaceable natural asset." The parties to the rental 
agreement went back to the conference table to spend an 
additional three years before reaching a deadlock. In 1970, 
Seattle applied to the Federal Power Commission for 
permission to commence work on Ross Dam as authorized 
by the IJC, while British Columbia sought reversal of the 
IJC's original approval. Additional negotiations yielded no 
resolution, but the IJC did agree to conduct an 
environmental and ecological study to determine the effects 
of the plan. While the Commission studied, the FPC 
deliberated on Seattle's application but has yet to reach a 
decision. 
In 1974, the government of British Columbia refunded 
Seattle's rental payment and formally asked the IJC to 
nullify its 1942 approval of Seattle City Light Company's 
application. While the Commission has chosen not to act on 
the request for the time being, it has formed a Canadian 
environmental advisory group to reexamine the results of its 
initial environmental study. Seattle City Light, in the 
meantime, has invested more than five million dollars in a 
project it considers certain to be licensed by the Federal 
Power Commission, thus raising the spectre of its seeking 
compensation from the province if efforts to halt the project 
are successful. 
The similarities of the Skagit River and Cabin Creek 
issues are indeed striking, but they are hardly encouraging. 
British Col um bians fear destruction of the Skagit Valley just 
as Montanans fear for the Flathead River. The governments 
of Montana and British Columbia both confront large, well 
financed firms with enormous incentive to develop the 
resources in the affected areas. Both must rely on the good 
will of foreign governmnts and the operability of 
international institutions in the defense of their respective 
interests. 
The dissimilarities, however, are as important, especially 
from Montana's perspective. With respect to the Skagit 
controversy, British Columbia's back is "against the wall." 
The issue is far more advanced than the Cabin Creek matter 
inasmuch as British Columbia's satisfaction hinges on 
eventual reversal of an earlier IJC decision, an eventuality 
that could have severe repercussions within the framework 
of American-Canadian boundary affairs. Montanans must 
consider the question of whether Federal Power 
Commission licensing of the Ross Dam project would 
destroy the good will required for satisfactory resolution of 
the Cabin Creek issue since British Columbia holds the key 
to protecting Montana's interest. Finally, Montana holds no 
such key ot satisfying British Columbia with respect to the 
Skagit Valley; that matter rests completely with other 
American authorities and to some extent with the IJC. 
The New Democratic Party (NDP) under David Barrett 
headed the government of British Columbia during the 
storm of controversy which led to the refunding of Seattle's 
rental check. While there is no positive proof that the 
Americans' treatment of the Skagit issue colored British 
Columbia's reaction to the Cabin Creek issue, subsequent 
developments suggest that the Barrett government was 
reticent on the subject of Montana's interests, quite possibly 
because it had its hands full in the area of transboundary 
water problems. 
This reticence first materialized in February of 1975, less 
than a year after the NDP asked the International Joint 
Commission to reverse its 1942 Skagit decision. A senior 
reclamation officer of British Columbia's Department of 
Mines and Petroleum Resources, J. D. McDonald, turned 
down an invitation by Montana's Governor Tom Judge to 
discuss the Cabin Creek ·problem with the Governor and 
state resource officials. Representative Max Baucus' office 
learned later that even though McDonald had initially 
expressed a willingness to discuss the issue with Judge, the 
provincial government concluded that such a discussion 
would be premature in light of the "preliminary" nature of 
activities on Cabin Creek. The NDP government, however, 
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certainly had sufficient experience in such matters to realize 
that whether "preliminary" or not, the Cabin Creek activities 
had generated anxiety in Montana over a perceived threat to 
the state's interests. Discussion of the perceived threat 
between representatives of the two governments was a 
reasonable prospect under the circumstances, and the 
provincial government's response is difficult to understand. 
Until late October of 1975, there was little hope in the U.S. 
State Department that British Columbia's NDP government 
would endorse formal consultations with the United States 
over Cabin Creek, at least until Rio Algom applied for coal 
production licensing. One State Department official 
suggested that the NDP was ''fond of pulling the Eagle's 
feathers," partly because of an inherently nationalistic 
proclivity and partly because of perceived American 
intransigence on the Skagit issue. 
The NDP's ever more tenuous political position 
complicated the Cabin Creek matter as 1975 wore on. On 
November 26, 1975, just weeks before British Columbia's 
provincial elections, the Dominion accepted · the State 
Department's October 20 proposal for consultations on 
Cabin Creek. Ottawa suggested that the first round of 
discussions be held early in 1976. On December 11, 1975, the 
voters of British Columbia went to the polls and delivered a 
resounding landslide victory to William Bennett and the 
Social Credit Party. The election did little, however, to 
clarify the future of Cabin Creek and Montana's Flathead 
River. On the one hand, the Social Credit Party had amply 
proved its capabilities and skills in cooperating with the 
United States on transboundary water problems. Bennett, 
after all, had been Premier during the Canadian ratification 
of the Columbia River Treaty and had exhibited none of the 
NDP's proclivity toward "pulling the Eagle's feathers." 
Officials of the U.S. State Department were privately 
optimistic over the probability of fruitful negotiations with 
the Bennett government on Cabin Creek. 
On the other hand, the Social Credit Party had made an 
issue of the NDP's failure to promote new mining. 
Montanans wondered if the Bennett government would 
initiate a "crash" program to maximize coal production at 
the expense of the Flathead River. State Department officers 
wondered if political realities would severely constrain the 
Social Credit Party's perception of British Columbia's 
responsibilities under the Boundary Waters Treaty. Clearly, 
the provincial election portended change with respect to 
Cabin Creek, but few Americans could venture predictions 
on the kind of change. 
In preparing for the Cabin Creek talks, the State 
Department formed an interagency task force comprised of 
five agencies within the Department of the Interior, the U.S. 
Forest Service and the Environmental Protection Agency. 
The key Interior Department agencies were the Bureau of 
Mines, the Bureau of Land Management and the U.S. 
Geological Survey. The task force drafted papers on a range 
of technical questions that included the potential 
transboundary pollution threat from planned mining 
activities on Cabin Creek and the need for expanded 
cooperation with the Canadians in preserving the Flathead 
region. The task force sought to supply to American 
negotiators the scientific and technological background 
required for realistic evaluation of anticipated Canadian 
positions during the forthcoming consultations. The State 
Department knew from experience that transboundary 
water issues often center on esoteric scientific questions, and 
• 
that workable answers to such questions necessitate close 
support from the scientific community. 
The government of Montana also made preparations. Bill 
Christiansen, then Lieutenant Governor, held the office 
charged with responsibility for dealing with the Cabin Creek 
issue. He and his staff collected scientific data on the current 
base line quality of the Flathead drainage, and met 
periodically with the federal task force to develop positions 
and strategies. Christiansen's office had considerable 
previous experience in such matters, notably in the Poplar 
River controversy discussed earlier. 
A major source of American apprehension was the nature 
of British Columbia's laws governing pollution control and 
reclamation by coal mine operators. The province's Coal 
Mines Regulation Act lacks clearly defined standards for 
denial of coal mining licenses, a fact that troubled 
Montanans who are accustomed to the kind of specificity 
found in Montana's Strip Mining and Reclamation Act. The 
"comprehensive procedure for minimizing environmental 
damage" is tenuously rooted in statute, by American 
standards, inasmuch as the Coal Mines Regulation Act 
requires only that mine operators "maintain a reclamation 
program" and that they leave the land and water courses in a 
condition satisfactory" to British Columbia's Minister of 
Mines and Petroleum Resources. 
By contrast, the Montana act provides for disapproval of 
licensing applications when "the overburden on any part of 
the ... land described in the application" cannot be disposed 
of without "substantial deposition of sediment in the 
streambeds, landslides, or water pollution .... " Moreover, 
the Montana statute provides remedies for individuals who 
are damaged as a result of water pollution from coal mining 
operations: "An owner of ... real property who obtains all 
or part of his supply of water ... from an underground 
source ... may sue an operator to recover damages for 
contamination, diminution, or interruption of the water 
supply .... " 
The real effect of British Columbia's mining laws is not 
readily apparent in the language of the actual statutes. The 
licensing process itself is a better indicator since it reveals a 
highly developed procedure which involves scrutiny of 
licensing applications by professionals within several 
provincial bureaucracies. Leaving the land "in a condition 
satisfactory to the Minister" involves preparation oflengthy 
production and reclamation programs by the operators and 
approval of these programs by (1) the Minister of Lands, 
Forests, and Water Resources, (2) the Minister of 
Recreation and Conservation, and (3) the Minister of 
Agriculture. The professional staffs of the conulting 
ministries evaluate the proposed programs and submit to the 
respective executives their recommendations for 
enforcement not only of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, but 
also of the Water Pollution Control Act, the Environmental 
Land Use Act and others. While the lack of specific statutory 
language implies a high degree of discretion on the part of 
the Minister of Mines and Petroleum Resources, the actual 
licensing procedure reveals that the government of British 
Columbia takes the law very seriously. Less distinct are the 
parameters of ministerial discretion in light of public 
opinion on a given mining issue and-equally 
important-the nonstandard nature of the law. Implied is 
the possibility that satisfying the minister with respect to one 
licensing application may not be the same as satisfying him 
with respect to another. 
7 
With these and other questions in mind, negotiators 
representing the State Department and the government of 
Montana sat down to a table with representatives of British 
Columbia and the Dominion on March 9, 1976, in Ottawa. 
To the relief of many Montanans, the provincial negotiators 
receded from the previous "vague assurances" rendered by 
the Barrett government, and offered instead to discuss 
specific ways to ensure the protection of Montana's interests 
on the Flathead River. As Professor Hans Peterson of 
Northern Montana College notes, the Canadians offered to 
provide "detailed environmental impact studies" relating to 
the Cabin Creek operation "as these become available," and 
to obtain input both from Montana and the State 
Department of the effectiveness of provincial licensing 
requirements in protecting the Boundary Waters Treaty. 
Further consultations, they agreed, could be held in the 
event that Montana discovered dangers in the provincial 
licensing plans. 
In accordance with the agreement, British Columbia 
subsequently furnished to American authorities a com-
prehensive three-stage licensing plan. Stage I provides for a 
detailed "preliminary assessment" by Rio Algom (for 
review and possible modification by the province) of the full 
range of its anticipated activities on Cabin Creek. Included is 
analysis of existing data for the purpose of identifying "data 
gaps" which must be filled to ensure effective enforcement of 
the law. 
Following the review and acceptance of Stage I, Rio 
Algom will prepare a more detailed development program 
that includes site specific impact statements as the operation 
bears on water, aquatic and air resources-Stage IL The 
province will then review this program with special attention 
to suggested alternative ways of managing and minimizing 
the impacts. 
Stage III is the final preparation of operational plans in 
accordance with the province's evaluations and stipulations 
pursuant to the previous stage. Following Rio Algom's 
applications for the necessary licenses, the government will 
prepare programs and systems to monitor the construction 
and operation of the Cabin Creek mine. Cabinet approval or 
denial of the licensing applications is the culmination of 
Stage III. 
The critical feature of the system is Montana's access to 
the mountain of studies, reports and evaluations attendant 
to the licensing process. While the Ottawa agreement 
guaranteed this access, the burden of recognizing and acting 
on potential threats to its own Flathead interests rests 
squarely on Montana's shoulders. Whether the government 
of Montana possesses the wherewithal and resolve to guard 
diligently against degradation of the Flathead River is a 
matter that must be left to others to pursue. Despite its 
enormous resources and its demonstrated resolve, the State 
Department faces myriad controversies and issues relating 
to U.S.-Canadian relations and cannot be expected to act 
energetically on the Cabin Creek issue if Montana is not 
"willing to carry its own ball." 
The licensing process is underway. British Columbia's 
Minister of the Environment, James A. Nielsen, reported to 
Max Baucus on October 22, 1976, that Rio Algom had 
submitted a Stage I report and that the various provincial 
agencies had completed their respective reviews. Still 
uncertain, however, is whether the Sage Creek Project is 
economically feasible from Rio Algom's perspective, at least 
over the short term. Nielsen's letter to Baucus mentioned 
that Rio Algom has contemplated "a smaller scale 
development" at Cabin Creek, ostensibly because of 
fluctuating marketing conditions abroad. 
Whether Montana confronts the reality of Cabin Creek 
coal mining as an immediate or distant development, the 
reality itself remains. Given the existence of the Crowsnest 
Field and its geographical proximity to transboundary water 
flow, and given the fact of an energy-hungry world that turns 
its eyes more and more to coal, a clear need emerges to 
modify the institutions for dealing with Cabin Creek-type 
issues. A number of considerations lead to this conclusion. 
First, there is no guarantee that Canada's Department of 
External Affairs and America's State Department, the 
functional entities of the Boundary Water Treaty, can 
adequately represent the interests of Canadian provinces 
and American states in transboundary water issues. This is 
woefully apparent in the handling of the Poplar River and 
Skagit Valley issues. In the Poplar River affair, the 
Department of External Affairs appears unable to restrain 
Saskatchewan from acting unilaterally despite agreements 
to do otherwise with Montana and the State Department. In 
the Skagit Valley affair, the State Department appears 
unable to influence the decision on whether to permit the 
raising of Ross Dam while the Department of External 
Affairs is similarly unable to protect the interests of British 
Columbia. The very proliferation of border 
controversies- concerning transboundary water and air, 
television broadcasting and a host of others- limits the time 
and energies the State Department can devote to any single 
issue. States like Montana are consequently forced into the 
unfamiliar arena of international relations when confronted 
with a problem like the Poplar River or Cabin Creek issues. 
Second, existing institutions do not account adequately 
for Canadian federalism. The major written component of 
Canada's constitution, the British North America Act, 
engendered a clear principle of "Divided Sovereignty," and 
allocated to the provinces the power to deal with all matters 
relating to property. Provinces have nearly exclusive 
jurisdiction in disposition of natural resources on publicly 
owned lands. 
In view of Canadian federalism, the Boundary Waters 
Treaty should have been signed by the United States and 
each of the provinces. "Injury to health and property" are 
provincial concerns. Seldom if ever does the Dominion 
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interfere in those concerns. The need, then, is for a new 
framework of American-Canadian relations that promotes a 
maximum degree of closeness and cooperation between the 
provinces and the various echelons of American 
government. 
Could such a "new framework" be formalized by written 
agreement? There is little reason to think not. A compact 
signed by the governments of the ·united States, Montana 
and British Columbia-aimed specifically at coordinated 
multilateral examination of trans boundary water issues and 
cooperative efforts to deal with them-should be a realistic 
goal. An important feature of any new mechanism is public 
education as to the stakes such issues involve. The 
signatories would thus be able to gauge each others' political 
constraints through input from interest groups and 
associations, and would be better able to exercise the "art of 
the possible" in formulating proposals and goals. Such a 
compact could serve as a blueprint for other states and other 
provinces to follow in seeking solutions to their respective 
controversies. 
British Columbia's display of good faith in the Ottawa 
Cabin Creek agreement does not end the issue. Mentioned 
earlier was the question of whether Montana can take 
advantage of the province's willingness to share the 
evaluation oflicensing applications. Although this is a major 
concern, more fundamental questions arise. Can the 
application of high technology suggested by the three-stage 
licensing procedure render any kind of coal mine on Cabin 
Creek harmless to the Flathead Valley? What would happen 
if Montana and the State Department objected to a given 
licensing requirement and subsequent negotiations yielded 
no satisfactory compromise? Would British Columbia 
accede to American urgings to deny approval of the 
applications, thus foregoing the revenue and economic 
stimulus of renewed mining? These are questions that may 
not be properly addressed within the confines of present 
arrangements. 
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